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We present a fair and optimistic [7, 8] quantum contract signing protocol between two clients that
requires no communication with the third trusted party during the exchange phase. We discuss
its fairness and show that it is possible to design such a protocol for which the probability of a
dishonest client to cheat becomes negligible, and scales as N−1/2, where N is the number of messages
exchanged between the clients. Our protocol is not based on the exchange of signed messages: its
fairness is based on the laws of quantum mechanics. Thus, it is abuse-free [9], and the clients do
not have to generate new keys for each message during the Exchange phase. We discuss a real-life
scenario when the measurement errors and qubit state corruption due to noisy channels occur and
argue that for real, good enough measurement apparatus and transmission channels, our protocol
would still be fair. Our protocol could be implemented by today’s technology, as it requires in
essence the same type of apparatus as the one needed for BB84 cryptographic protocol [12]. Finally,
we briefly discuss two alternative versions of the protocol, one that uses only two states (based
on B92 protocol [24]) and the other that uses entangled pairs (based on [20]), and show that it is
possible to generalize our protocol to an arbitrary number of clients.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Contract signing [1] is an important security task with
many applications, namely to stock market and others
[2]. It is a two party protocol between Alice and Bob
who share a common contract and want to exchange each
others’ commitments to it, thus binding to the terms of
the contract. Usually, commitment is done by signing
the contract on the spot.
With the technology development, situations when
parties involved are physically far apart become more rel-
evant every day – distant people can communicate using
ordinary or e-mail, internet, etc. This poses new chal-
lenges to the problem. Forcing spatially distant parties
to exchange signatures opens the possibility of a fraud:
Bob may get the commitment from Alice (a copy of the
contract with her signature on it) without committing
himself, which creates an unfair situation. Indeed, hav-
ing Alice’s commitment enables Bob to appeal to a judge
to bind the contract (i.e., to enforce; declare it valid), by
showing Alice’s commitment to the contract (together
with his signature stamped on it). On the other hand,
although Alice did commit, she cannot prove it (prove
that she sent her commitment to Bob) and thus cannot
appeal to a judge. Moreover, she cannot prove that she
did not receive Bob’s commitment, so he can safely claim
that he behaved honestly and sent his commitment to
Alice. Note that initially Bob did not commit, but hav-
ing Alice’s commitment puts him in a position to later
in time choose whether to sign the contract or not, and
thus bind it or not, while Alice has no power to do either
of the two.
This situation is particularly relevant in a stock mar-
ket, for example, where prices of stocks may range over
time, but agents must commit beforehand to sell/buy at a
certain time in the future, for previously fixed prices. The
unfairness allows Bob to make risky decisions in the stock
market without being bound to them, unless he decides
so. The problem when distant parties wish to commit to
a common contract lies in the impossibility for an agent,
say Alice, to prove whether she has indeed committed
to it or not. Often, the contract signing problem is said
to be a variant of the so-called return receipt (or certi-
fied mail) problem, in which parties involved exchange
mails between each other asking for the proof confirming
whether the other side received the message, or not.
A simple solution to this unfair situation is to have a
trusted third party (usually referred to as Trent) medi-
ating the transaction - Alice and Bob send their com-
mitments to Trent, who then returns the receipts to the
senders, and performs the message exchange only upon
receiving both of the commitments. However, Trent’s
time and resources are expensive and should be avoided
as much as possible. Unfortunately, it has been shown
that there is no fair and viable contract signing proto-
col [1, 3], unless during the signature exchange phase
the signing parties communicate with a common trusted
agent, i.e., Trent. By fair protocol we mean that either
both parties get each other’s commitment or none gets.
By viable protocol we mean that, if both parties behave
honestly, they will both get each others’ commitments.
The essence of the proof of the above impossibility re-
sult is rather simple, and is related with the impossibil-
ity of establishing distributed consensus in asynchronous
networks [3]. The simple assumption we need for the
proof is the following: the protocol consists of a number
of messages exchanged between the two parties, so that
eventually, upon the termination of the protocol, both
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2Alice and Bob acquire the signature of the other. This
can be done by either sending pieces of signatures in each
message, or in a more sophisticated scenarios, by sending
partial information needed to calculate, upon running a
complex algorithm, the signature needed [4, 5]. We see
that if such protocol existed, it would have a final step
where one message is exchanged, say, from Bob to Al-
ice. In that case, before sending his last message, Bob
would already have all the information required for him
to compute Alice’s signature of the contract (and Alice
does not). Therefore, if he does not send the last message,
the protocol reaches an unfair state. Note the essential
importance of the asynchronousity – it is not possible for
distant parties to arrange in advance that messages are
sent simultaneously.
One way to come around this difficulty is to consider
optimistic protocols that do not require communication
with Trent unless something wrong comes up (some mes-
sage is missing, etc.) [8]. In such protocols, the clients
contact Trent regarding the given contract before the ac-
tual signing takes place. Trent notifies the request and
assigns the particular contract with the clients, this way
initializing the signing protocol. After that, the clients
exchange messages between each other such that, if the
protocol is executed correctly by both sides, both will end
up with signed messages. In case something goes wrong
(message that is not according to the protocol is sent, or
communication interrupted), Trent is contacted in order
to bind the contract.
Another workaround is to relax the fairness condition
probabilistically. Probabilistic fairness allows one agent
to have at most ε more probability of binding the con-
tract over the other agent, at each step of the protocol.
In this case, for an arbitrarily small ε, classical solutions
have been found where the number of exchanged mes-
sages between the agents is minimized [6, 7]. In addition
to being (probabilistically) fair, in the protocol by Ra-
bin [6] the joint probability that one agent can bind the
contract, while the other cannot, is also always smaller
than given ε. Moreover, the second protocol by Ben-Or
et. al [7] satisfies even stronger condition: the conditional
probability that an agent cannot bind the contract, given
that the other can, can be made arbitrarily small. Note
that the two notions are not exclusive: the protocol [7]
is both fair and optimistic.
In this paper, we present a (probabilistically) fair
contract signing protocol where no information with a
trusted third party (Trent) is exchanged during the ex-
change phase. This way, it avoids possible communica-
tion bottlenecks that are otherwise inherent when involv-
ing Trent. Information exchange takes place during the
initialization phase and possibly later during the (con-
tract) binding phase (the protocol is optimistic [8]: Trent
is rarely asked to bind the contract due to protocol fair-
ness - cheating does not pay off). Unlike previous clas-
sical proposals, in our quantum protocol the messages
exchanged between the clients (Alice and Bob) during
the exchange phase do not have to be signed. Conse-
quently, our protocol is abuse-free [9]: a client has no
proof that (s)he communicated with the other client, at-
tempting to sign a given contract. In our protocol only
two signed messages are exchanged. This is very impor-
tant when one wants to achieve unconditional security. In
the case of classical protocols, digital pseudo-signatures
[10] should be used, where key is one-use and expen-
sive to generate. Finally, our protocol can be used in
solving some purely quantum protocols involving timely
decisions between spatially distant parties, such was the
case of simultaneous dense coding and teleportation [11].
In classical cryptography the contract exchange is done
in the way that respective participants are learning some
information (signed message, etc.) bit by bit, thus in-
creasing their knowledge. In order to bind the contract
they have to present the (complete) information to Trent.
Our approach is somewhat different, and is based on the
laws of quantum physics.
Quantum systems obey the laws of quantum physics,
which exhibit some counterintuitive features that are
quite distinct from those of classical physics. The prin-
ciple of quantum superposition, entanglement and in-
terference, to name just a few, have found numerous
applications in the growing field of quantum informa-
tion and computation, bringing about many advantages
of quantum-based information processing protocols over
those using classical systems only. Quantum cryptogra-
phy [12, 13] guarantees secure communication and de-
vices based on its principles can be already bought on a
market today; Shor’s algorithm for factoring [14] is expo-
nentially faster than any known classical counterpart; the
use of entanglement can in some cases of distributed in-
formation processing protocols considerably decrease the
amount of information exchange between distant parties
needed to perform a given task, thus decreasing (quan-
tum) communication complexity of the problem [15] and
can even eliminate any need of communication that is
classically necessary for achieving a goal of common in-
terest of separated parties [16] (a feature often referred
in literature to as pseudo-telepathy). For an overview of
the field of quantum information and computation, see
for example [17].
In solving the contract signing problem, we use quan-
tum complementarity which as a consequence has the im-
possibility to unambiguously discriminate between two
quantum states unless they are mutually orthogonal
[18, 19]. This fact is at the heart of the security of quan-
tum cryptographic protocols. In particular, as the setups
of the famous BB84 quantum key distribution protocol
[12] and our contract signing protocol have conceptual
similarities, so the security of the former is closely related
to the fairness of the latter. At the end, we show an alter-
native version of our contract signing protocol that uses
quantum entanglement, a non-local version of comple-
3mentarity1. Entanglement provides the possibility of re-
placing the exchange of classical information with Trent
during the exchange phase, by establishing the proper
type of correlations between the distant parties, in a sim-
ilar fashion as in Ekert’s key distribution protocol that
uses entangled states [20].
The very same mechanism of commitment to one spe-
cific choice can be used to establish e.g., a bit commit-
ment protocol. Note that unconditionally secure bit com-
mitment is not possible without Trent [21, 22], although
it is realizable using other assumptions as well.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next sec-
tion we present the quantum contract signing protocol
that requires no communication with Trent during the
exchange phase, is optimistic and fair. In Section III.
we present the conditions we require for the protocol to
be fair. In the Section IV. we discuss its fairness for
the case of ideal measurements restricted to only two al-
ternative single-particle observables. In Section V. we
analyze the case of general multi-particle measurements
(POVMs) and argue that under the assumption of noisy
channels and realistic detectors with error rates, it is still
possible to design a fair protocol. We also discuss alter-
native protocols that, instead of four states, use either
two non-orthogonal states, or entangled pairs. Finally,
we present a generalization to the case of more than two
agents. In Conclusions we present a short overview of
the results presented and some of possible future lines of
research.
II. THE PROTOCOL
In order for it to be fair, any contract signing protocol
has to force a client to make only one out of two possi-
ble choices - accept or reject the contract. A conceptu-
ally similar situation occurs in quantum physics, where
an observer cannot simultaneously measure two comple-
mentary observables, say the position and the velocity of
a quantum system. In other words, an observer is forced
to choose to measure only one out of two possible ob-
servables and gain information about only one out of two
physical properties of the system observed. For example,
by measuring the exact position of a quantum particle,
we are left with complete uncertainty of its velocity, and
vice versa (Heisenberg uncertainty relations).
This basic feature of quantum physics is the essential
ingredient of our protocol: instead of sending to Trent
the information that explicitly states the acceptance or
rejection of the contract, Alice reveals her choice by mea-
1 Both quantum complementarity and quantum entanglement
could be seen as consequences of the Heisenberg uncertainty prin-
ciple and ultimately, the superposition principle.
suring one of the two complementary observables, thus
acquiring information about only one of the two possible
features of the system given to her by Trent (and the
same for Bob). Gaining information about one feature
thus corresponds to the acceptance, while acquiring in-
formation about the other corresponds to rejection of the
contract. This information can later be used as a proof
of client’s choice.
As a client’s measurement is local, no information is
exchanged between a client and Trent, during the ex-
change phase. Only latter, during the possible binding
phase, this (classical) information obtained by a client’s
measurement is confronted with Trent’s (classical) infor-
mation of the quantum state in which he prepared the
quantum system distributed to a client, and thus used as
verification of client’s choice.
To ensure the timely decisions, Trent provides Alice
with the classical information of the quantum state in
which Bob’s quantum system is prepared, and vice versa.
This way, the clients can confront each others’ measure-
ment results with the classical data provided by Trent,
thus obtaining each others’ commitment choices before a
certain fixed moment in time. Since quantum mechan-
ics is essentially a probabilistic theory, the clients are
supplied by a number of systems, giving rise to the prob-
abilistic fairness of the protocol.
In our protocol, we use the simplest two-dimensional
quantum systems called qubits. The complementary ob-
servables could be seen as spin components (for elec-
trons), or linear polarizations (for photons), along two
mutually orthogonal axes. We will denote the two observ-
ables measured on single qubits as the Accept observable
Aˆ and the Reject observable Rˆ. Measuring Aˆ corresponds
to the acceptance, while measuring Rˆ corresponds to the
rejection of the contract. The two observables Aˆ and
Rˆ are required to be mutually complementary and are
given by mutually unbiased bases [18] BA = {|0〉, |1〉}
(the Accept basis) and BR = {|−〉, |+〉} (the Reject ba-
sis), respectively, such that |±〉 = (|1〉 ± |0〉)/√2. Both
observables have the same eigenvalues, 0 and 1, such that
Aˆ = 1 · |1〉〈1|+ 0 · |0〉〈0|,
Rˆ = 1 · |+〉〈+|+ 0 · |−〉〈−|. (1)
During the Initialization phase, Trent randomly prepares
qubits, each in one of the four states {|0〉, |1〉, |−〉, |+〉},
taken from the Accept or the Reject basis. Thus, each
qubit state |ψ〉 ∈ {|0〉, |1〉, |−〉, |+〉} is defined by two clas-
sical bits C = (Cb, Cs), first of which defines the basis
(Cb = 1 if |ψ〉 ∈ BA, while Cb = 0 otherwise) while
the second defines the particular state from a given basis
(Cs = 1 if |ψ〉 ∈ {|1〉, |+〉}, while Cs = 0 otherwise). For
each qubit sent to Alice in a state |ψ〉A, Trent sends to
Bob classical bits CA = C(|ψ〉A) assigned to this state,
and analogously for Bob.
During the Exchange phase, that might take place
much later after the Initialization phase, the clients agree
4upon the actual contract, decide whether to commit to it
or not, and exchange each others’ commitments. On the
system in the state |ψ〉A, Alice measures either Aˆ or Rˆ,
depending on whether she decides to accept or reject the
contract, respectively, and then communicates her result
MA to Bob. Since the two observables are defined by
a pair of mutually unbiased bases, the statistics of mea-
surement results performed on a sequence of qubits each
of which is randomly prepared in one of the four states
{|0〉, |1〉, |−〉, |+〉} will be dramatically different depend-
ing on which observable is measured. For instance, when
Alice measures Aˆ on qubits prepared in the Accept basis,
the measurement outcomes are perfectly correlated with
the corresponding classical bits CAs given to Bob (i.e.,
MA = CAs ); when she measures Aˆ on qubits prepared in
the Reject basis produces, the results obtained are com-
pletely uncorrelated with the corresponding classical bits,
and analogously for Rˆ.
This way, by choosing one of the two measurements
performed on a sequence of qubits, Alice produces one
of two mutually exclusive sets of measurement outcomes
that serve as a signature of her choice (to accept or to
reject the contract). By sending the results to Bob, she
informs him of her decision by some fixed moment in time
t0. The same is done by Bob.
In the Binding phase, each party is asked to confront
her/his measurement results with the Trent’s correspond-
ing classical bits. The perfect correlation between mea-
surement results and the corresponding classical infor-
mation for qubits prepared in the Accept/Reject basis
confirms a client’s Accept/Reject choice. Trent declares
contract as valid, giving the signed certificates to both
clients, if a client, say Alice, accepted the contract, while
Bob did not reject it, or vice versa. Note that it is im-
possible, unless with negligible probability, to produce
perfect correlations on both sets of qubits (a direct con-
sequence of the security [13] of the BB84 protocol [12]).
In this and the next two sections we restrict ourselves
to the case of ideal measurements and noiseless quantum
channels (from Trent to the clients). The real-case sce-
nario is discussed in the penultimate section of the paper.
Obviously, the Exchange phase as described above suf-
fers from the same problem as any classical protocol
not involving information exchange with Trent: upon
receiving Alice’s results, Bob can stop communication
and safely postpone his decision to accept or reject the
contract to a later moment in time. Thus, we require
that the measurements and the exchange of measure-
ment outcomes between clients happens in steps, (qu)bit
by (qu)bit. Nevertheless, if we require perfect correla-
tions between the measuring results and the correspond-
ing classical information for all qubits distributed to a
client, in 1/4 of the cases an agent will be already after
the first step in a position to choose to, with probability
one, either bind or reject the contract.
Imagine the following situation. Alice is the first to
perform a measurement and send the classical informa-
tion to Bob. She is the honest party, she wants to ac-
cept the contract and thus she measures Aˆ onto her first
qubit. With probability 1/2, her first qubit will be pre-
pared in one of the states from the Reject basis. By
measuring Aˆ onto one of the {|−〉, |+〉} states, there is
1/2 of the probability that her result does not match the
value of CAs1 , and so with probability 1/4 Alice will not
be able to achieve perfect correlations between her mea-
surement outcomes and the corresponding classical data
of the qubits prepared in states from the Reject basis.
In other words, there is 1/4 of probability that an hon-
est side will already after the first step of the Exchange
phase be unable to reject the contract, even before the
other side performed any measurement. In such a situ-
ation, Bob can safely stop communication and postpone
his choice until later moment in time.
Thus, we require that in order to accept/reject the
contract, a client has to establish perfect correlations
on αNA/R qubits prepared in the Accept/Reject basis
(with the total number of qubits N = NA +NR), where
1/2 < α < 1. We call α the acceptance ratio (note
that, for a protocol to be viable, it is necessary that
α > 1/2). In this scenario, a client is allowed to obtain
(1−α)NA/R wrong results for the states prepared in the
basis of her/his choice (Accept or Reject). If α is suffi-
ciently large, this eliminates the possibility of obtaining
good enough correlations for both groups of qubits, this
way eliminating the above mentioned unfair situation.
In the rest of this section, we present a formal descrip-
tion of our protocol. Our protocol is optimistic and as
such it is divided into three phases: the Initialization,
the Exchange (see Fig. 1) and the Binding phase. Dur-
ing the Exchange phase agents exchange their measure-
ment results. If both clients are honest and perform mea-
surements according to the protocol (measure the Accept
observable), the Exchange phase will end up with both
clients having their probabilities to bind the contract ex-
ponentially (in number of qubits) close to one: the proto-
col is viable and optimistic (clients do not need to contact
Trent as they already know the answer). If a client, say
Bob, is dishonest and performs measurements other than
that prescribed by the protocol (or just guesses the out-
comes), he will unavoidably obtain wrong outcomes for
some of the qubits from the Accept basis. If Alice de-
tects a wrong result (Bob’s cheating), she interrupts the
exchange and proceeds to the Binding phase. In a real-
istic case of measurement errors, Alice will have to set a
threshold for the allowed number of wrong results below
which she continues with the exchange. We discuss it at
the end of this paper.
The Initialization Phase: Trent produces N pairs of
qubits in states (|ψ〉Am, |ψ〉Bm) with the corresponding clas-
sical description (CAm, C
B
m) = ((C
A
bm
, CAsm), (C
B
bm
, CBsm)),
with m ∈ {1, . . . N}. The rule of assigning the classical
data to the corresponding qubit states is the following:
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FIG. 1: (color online) The Initialization and The Exchange
Phase.
C
A/B
bm
= 1 if |ψ〉A/Bm ∈ BA, while CA/Bbm = 0 otherwise;
C
A/B
sm = 1 if |ψ〉A/Bm ∈ {|1〉, |+〉}, while CA/Bsm = 0 oth-
erwise. Each qubit state is randomly chosen from the
set {|0〉, |1〉, |−〉, |+〉}. Trent distributes to Alice N qubits
|ψ〉Am and 2N classical bits CBm, and analogously for Bob,
keeping the copy of the classical data to himself. He as-
signs a unique identifier (number) to all data so that it
can be linked in the Exchange phase to a specific contract.
The Exchange Phase: Alice and Bob agree on a con-
tract and exchange signed messages containing the con-
tract, the identifier of qubits sequence they want to use,
and some previously arranged moment in time t0 giving
time restriction to finish the Exchange phase. (This does
not bind them to the contract!) Alice and Bob perform
measurements on their qubits and exchange the measure-
ment results with each other. Without the loss of general-
ity, we assume Alice is the first to start communication.
She measures an observable of her choice (Aˆ or Rˆ) on
the state |ψ〉A1 , obtaining the result MA1 ∈ {0, 1}, and
sends it to Bob. Bob compares MA1 with C
A
s1 . If the val-
ues are different, Alice measured her qubit in the basis
corresponding to (1 + CAb1) mod 2. Otherwise, the com-
parison is inconclusive. Next, Bob repeats the procedure
described for Alice. The rest of the exchange consists in
repeating the above procedure for the states (|ψ〉Am, |ψ〉Bm)
with m ∈ {2, . . . N}. If a client, say Alice, does not ob-
tain a result from Bob until t0 or receives for a qubit from
the Accept basis a result different from the corresponding
classical data (CBbm = 1 ∧MBm 6= CBbm), she immediately
proceeds to the Binding phase.
The Binding Phase: At the beginning of the Binding
phase Trent chooses α ∈ (1/2, 1) randomly and indepen-
dently, according to a publicly known probability distri-
bution p(α). Without the loss of generality, we assume
that Alice contacts Trent to decide validity of the con-
tract. She decides according to her preference whether
she want to bind or to reject the contract. In the for-
mer case she measures all unmeasured qubits in the Ac-
cept basis, in the latter in the Reject base. Both parties
then report Trent for each respective qubit whether they
measured it in the Accept or Reject basis, and submit re-
spective measurement outcomes. Trent verifies whether
their measurement outcomes correspond to their claims.
If there is a mismatch in measurements of, say Bob, he
is declared as cheater and Trent considers only Alice’s
measurement outcomes. Let NAA (N
A
R ) denote the num-
ber of Alice’s qubits prepared in the Accept (Reject) ba-
sis, and analogously NBA and N
B
R for Bob. The contract
is declared as valid if Alice presents at least αNAA accept
results and Bob presents less than αNBR reject results, or
when Bob presents at least αNBA accept results and Alice
presents less than αNAR reject results. In case a client,
say Bob, supplied incorrect measurement outcomes (see
above), Trent declares the contract to be valid if Alice
presents at least αNAA accept results. In all other cases
the contract is declared as invalid.
III. FAIRNESS CONDITIONS
As noted in the previous section, our protocol is (prob-
abilistically) viable: if both clients are honest, the prob-
ability to bind the contract is exponentially close to one.
Therefore, it is also optimistic: honest clients do not need
to contact Trent in order to obtain the verdict that, with
exponentially high probability, they already know. In
case a client, say Bob, is not honest, i.e. is not measur-
ing the Accept observable in every step of the protocol,
we say that he is cheating. Any cheating strategy will in-
evitably have a non-zero probability of producing a wrong
result on qubits from the Accept basis, thus allowing Al-
ice to detect Bob’s cheating and move on to the Binding
phase.
In case the Exchange phase is terminated due to cheat-
ing detected, all we can predict is the probability that
Trent declares the contract as valid. This probability de-
pends on the moment when the exchange was aborted as
well as on actions of both parties (before and after the ex-
change was terminated). The preferences of the signing
parties may change (due to commodity price changes,
etc.) before it is possible to reach Trent. We say that
parties are symmetric, if the probability that Trent de-
clares the contract as valid is (almost) the same regard-
less whether honest Alice wants to bind the contract and
Bob wants to reject it, or vice versa. Note that we do
not care about trivial cases when both want to reject or
both to bind the contract.
This notion of symmetry is close to the weak coin toss-
ing problem [23]: if both Alice and Bob want the same
outcome (0 or 1), there is no need to guarantee unbiased
coin toss. On the other hand, it is vital to assure as little
bias as possible, if their preferences are contradictory.
6In this section, we present our formal fairness con-
ditions that allow for such symmetric positions of the
clients. In the following, we assume Alice to be honest
and Bob dishonest client.
The probability to bind the contract, Pbind, is a prob-
ability that during the Binding phase Trent, upon re-
ceiving classical information from both Alice and Bob
(i.e., their measurement results), declares the contract as
valid and hands in to both Alice and Bob signed (i.e.,
validated) copies of the contract.
The probability to bind is a function of step m, after
which the communication is broken (typically, if cheating
is noticed, or a connection between the clients broken).
It is also a function of clients’ strategies. In this section,
we will consider the case of one-particle measurements
only. As shown in section V., the general case of multi-
particle measurements, acting on at most L qubits, can
be reduced to the case of one-qubit measurements, by
considering the blocks of L qubits as units and then ap-
plying the same reasoning to the sequence of N/L such
units. The case of global measurements on all N qubits
is discussed at the end of Section V.
Restricting ourselves to one-qubit measurements, for a
fixed parameter α, the probability to bind is a function
of clients’ measurements before the step m, XA for Alice,
XB for Bob, and their behavior after the step m, Y A for
Alice, Y B for Bob. Thus,
Pbind = Pbind(m,α, (X
A, XB), (Y A, Y B)). (2)
Alice is an honest client, so her strategy is XA =
Aˆ⊗m. In Section V. we show that, when measured on
qubits prepared in one of the states from the Accept
and the Reject bases, general one-qubit measurements
produce probability distributions equivalent to those ob-
tained when only the Accept and the Reject observables
are measured. Therefore, Bob’s strategy, in which he
measures the Aˆ observable (m − δm) times, while Rˆ
observable is measured δm times (the order is irrele-
vant), is XB = Aˆ⊗(m−δm)Rˆ⊗(δm). Thus, we can write
XB = XB(m, δm).
The only two relevant strategies after step m are those
in which one client wants to bind the contract and the
other does not want to bind the contract. The one
who wants it bound measures the Accept observable,
Y = Aˆ⊗(N−m). The other, who does not want it bound,
measures the Reject observable, Y = Rˆ⊗(N−m). If Al-
ice wants the contract bound, Y A = Aˆ⊗(N−m), and
Bob doesn’t, Y B = Rˆ⊗(N−m), we call the correspond-
ing probability Alice’s probability to bind the contract,
PAbind(m,α,X
A, XB), and analogously for Bob (note that
in this notation, clients’ strategies after step m are not
explicitly written). We will calculate clients’ probabili-
ties to bind the contract in the next section. Here, we
only note that we do not discuss cases when after step m
both clients want the same: if the protocol is fair for the
cases when clients’ wishes are opposite (a conservative
assumption), it will be when they wish the same.
Averaging over all possible Bob’s strategies XB (Alice
is honest, so her strategy is known), we obtain
PAbind(m,α) =
∑
XB
p(XB)PAbind(m,α,X
A, XB), (3)
and analogously for PBbind(m,α). Here, p(X
B) is the
probability that Bob chooses the particular strategy
XB = XB(m, δm), and is given by the probability
pw(δm) = 1 − (3/4)δm to obtain a wrong result, when
measuring the Reject observable δm times (obviously,
wrong results are, in the case of ideal measurements with
no errors, possible only on qubits from the Accept basis).
For our protocol to be fair, we require that at each
step m of the Exchange phase, the difference between the
agents’ (Alice and Bob) probabilities to bind the contract
can be made arbitrarily small: for any given ε,
|PBbind(m,α)− PAbind(m,α)| < ε. (4)
In order to make our protocol even more symmetric,
we introduce the probability to cheat of a dishonest client
(Bob). It is the product of Bob’s probability to bind, and
the probability that Alice will not bind the contract:
PBch(m,α,X
A, XB) = PBbind(m,α,X
A, XB) (5)
×[1− PAbind(m,α,XA, XB)].
After the averaging over Bob’s strategies XB(m) prob-
ability to cheat of a dishonest client Bob is:
PBch(m,α) =
∑
XB
p(XB)PBch(m,α,X
A, XB). (6)
Our second fairness requirement is that a dishonest
client’s (Bob’s) probability to cheat PBch(m,α) is also neg-
ligible2. Note that in our protocol the Binding phase
requires both clients to confront their measurement re-
sults, both obtaining the same verdict by Trent at the
end. Therefore, although the probability to cheat is the
product of two probabilities, the probability that Bob can
bind the contract and the probability that Alice cannot,
it is not itself a probability of an event (Bob’s probability
to bind is obtained under the assumption that after step
m he measures Aˆ and Alice Rˆ; to obtain Alice’s prob-
ability to bind, we assume that after step m she is the
one to measure Aˆ while Bob measures Rˆ). Yet, it can
serve as a measure of protocol’s fairness as it quantifies
agent’s freedom to choose between binding and refusing
2 Obviously, if the second fairness requirement is satisfied, the
first if satisfied as well: having negligible probability to cheat
is stronger condition than the symmetry between the client’s
probabilities to bind the contract.
7the contract later in time. We discuss this in more de-
tail at the end of this section. At the end of the paper,
we show that it is straightforward to design a protocol in
which it is not necessary that both clients are (simultane-
ously) present during the binding phase. In this scenario,
the corresponding probability to cheat becomes the joint
probability that one client can bind the contract, while
the other cannot.
Unfortunately, although the first fairness criterion is
satisfied for the above protocol, its probability to cheat
can be as high as 1/4: in case both clients measure the
Accept observable, both clients’ probabilities to bind are
monotonic functions, such that for big enough N there
exists ms for which P
A
bind(ms, α) ≈ PBbind(ms, α) ≈ 1/2.
But if α, determined by Trent by sampling a random
variable described by a publicly known probability dis-
tribution p(α), is itself unknown to the clients, and deter-
mined only later during the Binding phase, the expected
probability to cheat P¯ch(m) becomes negligible, for big
enough N . Thus, our second fairness condition finally
reads as: for any given ε,
P¯Bch(m)=
∫
p(α)PBbind(m,α)[1−PAbind(m,α)]dα < ε. (7)
The coefficient α is sampled randomly by Trent to achieve
stronger security requirements. This assures symmetric
position of honest and cheating participant even before
Trent is contacted during the Binding phase: if agents
are temporarily unable to contact Trent, cheaters should
not profit from this in a significant way.
A client, say Bob, may be willing to take the risk
and stop the protocol prematurely during the Exchange
phase, provided such a situation can assure him some rea-
sonable position. Consider a contract where Alice buys
orange juice from Bob for X units per litter. According
to the market expectation, with probability p the price
should increase and with probability (1 − p) decrease.
When the price goes up to X ′ > X, Alice wants to en-
force the contract, since otherwise she should buy juice
for higher price. Bob wants the contract to be canceled
to sell the juice for higher price. In case the price drops,
the situation is symmetric.
Bob may be willing to take the risk parameterized by
δ in the following sense. The joint probability that the
price drops and he will be able to enforce the contract is
at least δ as well as the joint probability that price in-
creases and Alice won’t be able to enforce the contract.
The latter gives him protection from financial loses, while
the former allows him to spare some money. This is for-
malized as
(∃ 0≤p≤1 ) [p(1− PAbind) ≥ δ ∧ (1− p)PBbind ≥ δ] . (8)
Thus, to prevent reasonability of Bob’s cheating we re-
quire that
(∀ 0≤p≤1) [p(1− PAbind) ≤ δ ∨ (1− p)PBbind ≤ δ] . (9)
Let us denote Y
def
= PBbind(m,α)[1−PAbind(m,α)] the ran-
dom variable parameterized by α. The expected value
E(Y ) =
∫
p(α)PBbind(m,α)[1− PAbind(m,α)]dα (10)
is nothing but the expected probability to cheat P¯ch(m)
(note that due to PBbind(m,α) ≈ PAbind(m,α), we have
P¯ch(m) ≡ P¯Bch(m) ≈ P¯Ach(m) ). Using the above fairness
criterion P¯ch(m) < ε, Chebyshev inequality, and putting
δ3 = ε, we obtain Probα[Y < δ + δ
3] ≥ 1 − δ. Thus, the
probability δ can be made arbitrarily small with arbitrar-
ily high probability.
IV. FAIRNESS OF THE PROTOCOL: IDEAL
CASE
In the following, we show that our protocol is fair: both
|PBbind(m,α)−PAbind(m,α)| and P¯ch(m) could be made ar-
bitrarily low. In this section, we assume that only Aˆ or Rˆ
are measured, and that no measurement errors or qubit
state corruption occur. In the next section, we discuss
general (one or multi-qubit) observables and real-life sce-
nario of imperfect measurements and noisy channels.
In case Bob is cheating during the Exchange phase, he
will be detected after a small number of steps, with prob-
ability growing exponentially in the number of qubits
measured by Alice. Assume Bob’s cheating is detected
after Alice measured m qubits. Alice terminated the Ex-
change phase and participants proceed with the Binding
phase, that can be delayed (Trent is offline). Meanwhile,
participants are allowed to change their preferences and
we would like to examine symmetry of their position. We
are interested only in the situation when Alice wants to
bind the protocol and Bob wants to reject, and vice versa.
In the former case Alice tries to do her best to bind
the contract. This means she measures all unmeasured
qubits in the Accept basis and sends her results to Trent.
Bob does his best to invalidate the contract, measuring
his qubits in the Reject basis. Note that possible lying
about measurement basis on respective qubit is detected
with probability growing exponentially in the number of
wrongfully reported measurement results, so the number
of measurements Bob can lie about is well limited.
If the cheating was detected and the Exchange phase
was terminated after m steps, Alice’s probability to bind
the contract is, for a given α, given by the following ex-
pression:
PAbind(m,α,X
A, XB) = PAA (m,α,X
A)[1−PBR (m,α,XB)],
(11)
and analogously for Bob. Probability to accept the con-
tract, PA, is the probability that a client who wants the
contract bound, thus after step m measuring the Accept
observable, will pass the Trent’s test during the Bind-
ing phase. Probability to reject the contract, PR, is
8the probability that a client who does not want the con-
tract bound, thus after step m measuring the Reject ob-
servable, will invalidate the contract during the Binding
phase. Note that under this convention it is redundant
to specify clients’ strategies Y after the step m. Also,
clients’ probabilities to accept and reject the contract de-
pend only upon their own strategies before the step m,
and not those of the opponent.
Alice’s probability to accept the contract is
PAA (m,α) = 1: she is an honest client and thus is
measuring Aˆ in every step until the interruption; she
wants the contract bound, so continues to measure
the Accept observable. Her probability to reject the
contract can be written in a simplified form as PAR (m,α),
bearing in mind that in this case XA(m) = Aˆ⊗m and
Y A(m) = Rˆ⊗(N−m).
Out of m steps, a dishonest Bob measures the Ac-
cept observable (m − δm) times, and the remaining δm
times the Reject observable. Therefore XB(m, δm) =
Aˆ⊗(m−δm)Rˆ⊗(δm). When rejecting the contract, his
strategy is Y B(m) = Rˆ⊗(N−m), and we see that Bob’s
probability to reject is the same as Alice’s probability
to reject, had the interruption occurred δm steps be-
fore, PBR (m,α, δm) = P
A
R (m − δm, α). When measuring
the Reject observable, the probability to obtain wrong
results on states from the Accept basis, and thus be-
ing detected cheating, is exponentially fast approach-
ing to one, pw(δm) = 1 − (3/4)δm. Therefore, for
1/2 < α < 1 and large enough N , δm << (1 − α)N .
The expected δm is small and since for large enough N
all the probabilities are slow functions of m, we have
PBA (m,α, δm) ≈ PAA (m,α) = 1, while PAR (m,α) ≈
PAR (m − δm, α) = PBR (m,α). Therefore, the first fair-
ness condition PAbind(m,α) ≈ PBbind(m,α) is satisfied.
To show that the second fairness condition is also sat-
isfied, we first note that, due to PAR (m,α) ≈ PBR (m,α)
and PBA (m,α) ≈ PAA (m,α) = 1, the two probabilities to
cheat are almost the same and can be, for a given α,
written in terms of single expected probability to reject
the contract
Pch(m;α) = PR(m;α)(1− PR(m;α)). (12)
The expected probability to reject, for a given α, is
PR(m;α) =
N∑
NR=0
q(NR)PR(m;α,NR), (13)
where PR(m;α,NR) is the probability to (be able to)
reject the contract (obtain less than (1 − α)NR wrong
results on qubits from the Reject basis, measuring the
Accept observable on the first m qubits), for a given ac-
ceptance ratio α and the number of qubits prepared in
the Reject basis NR, keeping for simplicity the N depen-
dence implicit, and q(NR) = 2
−N
(
N
NR
)
is the proba-
bility to have exactly NR states from the Reject basis.
Note that PR(m;α,NR) is calculated under the assump-
tion that the Accept observable is measured during the
first m steps, while after that the Reject observable is
measured for the remaining (N −m) steps.
For m < (1− α)NR there is always a chance to reject
the contract, thus PR(m;α,NR) = 1. Otherwise,
PR(m;α,NR) =
m′∑
n=n′
P (n in R;m,NR)PR(n in R;α,NR).
(14)
Here, the probability that exactly n out of the first m
qubit states are from the Reject basis is given by3
P (n in R;m,NR) =
(
m
n
)(
N −m
NR − n
)(
N
NR
)−1
,
(15)
while the probability of being able to reject the contract
if n qubits are from the Reject basis is given by4
PR(n in R;α,NR) = 2
−n
T∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
, (16)
where T = (1 − α)NR − 1 if n ≥ (1 − α)NR and T = n
otherwise. Due to the constraint of having exactly NA/R
qubits from the Accept/Reject basis, the range of the
summation for n in equation (14) is given by n′ = 0 for
m ≤ NA while n′ = m −NA otherwise, and m′ = m for
m ≤ NR while m′ = NR otherwise.
Finally, the expected probability to cheat, with respect
to a given probability distribution p(α) on the segment
Iα, is
P¯ch(m) =
∫
Iα
p(α)Pch(m;α)dα. (17)
Using the simplest uniform probability p(α) = 1/Iα on
the segment Iα = [0.9, 0.99], we numerically evaluated
the expected probability to cheat P¯ch(m) for up to N =
600, while for the “typical” case of NA = NR we managed
3 Since each sequence of N qubit states, prepared such that exactly
NR are from the Reject basis, is equally probable, the probability
P (n in R;m) is given by the ratio of the number of sequences
whose n out of NR qubits prepared in the Reject basis are among
the first m qubits, while the other (NR − n) are among the rest
of (N −m) qubits,
(
m
n
)(
N −m
NR − n
)
, and the total number of
allowed sequences is
(
N
NR
)
.
4 When measuring the Accept observable Aˆ on a state from the
Reject basis each of the two possible results are equally probable.
Therefore, each sequence of n such measurement results has the
probability 2−n. If exactly i out of n individual-qubit results
do not match those given by Trent to the other client, and if
i < (1 − α)N , then it is still possible to reject the contract.
There are
(
n
i
)
of such measurement results, for given n.
9to evaluate it up to N = 8000, see Fig. 2. We see
that the fairness condition supmP¯ch(m) << 1 is satisfied
(for N = 600 we got supmP¯ch(m) = P¯ch(92) = 0.0811,
while for NA = NR we have supmP¯ch(m) = P¯ch(1455) =
0.0247 forN = 8000), which is explicitly shown on Fig. 2.
Moreover, the numerical fit gives supmP¯ch(m) ∝ N−1/2
behavior, giving us the scaling of the complexity of the
protocol, with respect to the number N of exchanged
messages between Alice and Bob.
  
FIG. 2: (color online) The expected probability to cheat
P¯ch(m) (upper row) and the maximal expected probability
to cheat supmP¯ch(m) (lower row) for the uniform p(α) on
Iα = [0.9, 0.99]. The plots from the left column represents
results for our protocol, while the right ones are for the
restricted “typical” case of NA = NR. Note the scaling
behavior supmP¯ch(m) ∝ N−1/2.
V. FAIRNESS OF THE PROTOCOL: GENERAL
MEASUREMENTS AND NOISE
First, we consider only one-qubit orthogonal measure-
ments. Since Alice is an honest client, XA = Aˆ⊗m,
we have that PAA (m,α,X
A) = 1 and PAR (m,α,X
A) =
PR(m,α).
Bob is a dishonest client and his strategy XB consists
of measuring (m− k) times the Accept observable Aˆ and
k times observable Kˆ = 0 · |m〉〈m|+ 1 · |m⊥〉〈m⊥|, where
|m〉=cos θ
2
|0〉+eϕsin θ
2
|1〉=cos θ
′
2
|−〉+eϕ′sin θ
′
2
|+〉. (18)
Let m = ma+mr, where ma is the number of the Accept
and mr the number of the Reject qubits among the first
m qubits, and let ka be the number of measurements of
Kˆ on ma qubits from the Accept basis, and analogously
for kr. Bob’s measurements of Kˆ are equivalent to
5 (for
simplicity, we omit writing the α and NR dependences):
5 First, we consider measurements of Kˆ on qubits whose states
• qa · ka measurements of Aˆ and δma = [1 − qa] · ka
measurements of Rˆ on qubits from the Accept
basis, where qa = cos θ. Thus, the probability
to notice cheating after ka measurements of Kˆ
is p˜w(δma) = p˜w([1 − qa]ka) = 1 − (1/2)[1−qa]ka
and Bob’s probability to accept the contract is
PBA (m,α,X
B) ≡ PA(m,α;ma, δma);
• qr · kr measurements of Aˆ and δmr = [1 − qr] · kr
measurements of Rˆ on qubits from the Reject ba-
sis, where qr = cos θ
′. Thus, Bob’s measurements
are equivalent to (mr − δmr) measurements of Aˆ
on qubits from Reject basis and his probability to
reject is PBR (m,α,X
B) ≤ PR(m− δmr, α).
Since p˜w(δma) = 1− (1/2)[1−qa]ka , either ka is small, or
qa ≈ 1. In case of qa ≈ 1, we have that qr ≈ 0: the ob-
servable Kˆ is close to Aˆ and Bob’s strategy is close to that
of an honest client. In case, ka is small, we have that δma
is also small and Bob’s probability to accept the contract
is close to one, PBA (m,α,X
B) = PA(m,α;ma, δma) ≈ 1.
Moreover, since for typical cases ka ≈ kr, we have
that typically Bob’s probability to reject the contract
is PBR (m,α,X
B) ≈ PR(m,α). Therefore, the corrected
probability to cheat, averaged over all possible distribu-
tion of states (from the Accept and the Reject bases) and
all possible strategies of the clients, will not be consider-
ably altered and the protocol would still be fair, even if
arbitrary number of observables Kˆi is allowed. Note that,
according to the above and the analysis from the previ-
ous section, the complexity of the protocol, for the case
of general one-qubit orthogonal measurements, scales as
N ∝ ε−2, where N is the number of exchanged messages
and ε a given upper bound for the probability to cheat.
The above argument could be generalized for joint L-
qubit measurements, if L ∝ N t and t < 1: for every joint
observable (or general POVM) OˆL 6= ⊗Li=1Aˆi there is a
non-zero probability qL that at least one wrong result
will be obtained on the accept qubits, which scales as qkL,
are from the Accept basis. Let pk(0|0) be the conditional prob-
ability to obtain result 0 when measuring an observable Kˆ on
the state |0〉, and analogously for other conditional probabilities.
Notice that, when measuring an arbitrary one-qubit orthogonal
observable Kˆ, one has p(0|0) = p(1|1) = sa: the probabilities to
obtain the right result on the states from the Accept basis are the
same. The two probabilities are also equal when one measures Aˆ
with frequency (i.e., probability) qa and Rˆ with frequency 1−qa.
The probability to obtain the right result on the states from the
Accept basis is then Sa = qa + (1 − qa)/2 = (1 + qa)/2: when
measuring Aˆ (with probability qa) one obtains the right result
with probability 1, while when measuring Rˆ (with probability
1− qa) one obtains the right result with probability 1/2. In or-
der for those two measurements to be equivalent, it is necessary
that sa = Sa = (1 + qa)/2. In the case of the orthogonal observ-
able Kˆ, we have sa = cos2(θ/2), and thus qa = cos θ. The same
argument applies for the case of measurements performed on the
states from the reject basis.
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k being the number of OˆL measurements (note that for
ideal measurements, Alice will notice cheating as soon
as she receives the first wrong result from Bob). Thus,
in case of performing joint measurements on at most L
qubits, for N/L >> 1, the protocol would still be fair.
In case L ∝ N the fairness of our protocol could be
seen as a consequence of the unconditional security of the
BB84 protocol in the presence of noisy channel and im-
perfect sources and detectors [13]: if we interpret (1−α)
as the error rate due to the noise (see the paragraph
below), then in order to successfully cheat in our con-
tract signing protocol, an agent would have to be correct
on both αNA qubits from the Accept basis and on αNR
qubits from the Reject bases, which in turn contradicts
the unconditional security of the BB84 protocol. Namely,
in order to pass the test by Alice and Bob and thus learn
the secret key, Eve has to know the states of qubits from
both mutually unbiased bases. In the presence of errors,
she needs to be correct only on the α fraction of qubits.
Since quantum cryptography is unconditionally secure,
that is not possible, unless with exponentially small prob-
ability. Thus, our quantum contract signing protocol is
fair. Note that, although the errors due to imperfect tech-
nology are inevitable, it is possible, at least in principle,
to make them arbitrary low. Therefore, if for some error
rate (1−α) it is not possible, unless with negligible prob-
ability, to have the right results on αNA/R qubits from
both the Accept and the Reject bases, then for some bet-
ter equipment the fairness condition would be satisfied.
In the case of measurement errors and noisy chan-
nels, one must introduce the error tolerance η = Mw/M ,
where Mw = 〈mw〉 ≡ ηM is the expected number of
wrong results obtained in measuring an observable on M
qubits prepared in states from the observable’s eigenba-
sis. Coefficient η gives the ratio of unavoidably produced
wrong results: to detect cheating would then mean to ob-
tain more than expected, according to η, wrong results.
For η < (1 − α) and big enough N , our protocol would
therefore still be fair.
Our protocol can be modified to use only two non-
orthogonal pure states, just like the B92 cryptographic
protocol [24] is modified after the BB84. Obviously, the
probabilities determining the features and complexity of
the protocol would be quantitatively different, but the
protocol would clearly still be fair.
We note that it is straightforward to design a proto-
col in which a single client can contact Trent to obtain
a signed contract. In this case, Trent sends to a client,
say Alice, classical information about only a half of, ran-
domly chosen, Bob’s qubit states. This information is
used by Alice to check Bob’s measurements: whether he
is measuring the Accept observable, or not. If so, he is
measuring the Accept observable on the rest of his qubits
as well (he does not know for which qubits Alice has the
classical information and for which not). Thus, the re-
sults Bob provided her for the rest of his qubits is used
by Trent to verify Alice’s data: instead of Bob appearing
with his results, Alice provides those given to her by Bob.
Note that in this case, unlike before, the corresponding
average probability to cheat is probability of a real event:
joint probability that an agent cannot bind the contract,
while the other can.
This version of the protocol is also suited for the use of
entangled pairs, instead of qubits in definitive pure states.
In this case, Trent produces 4N pairs of maximally entan-
gled qubits in the singlet state |ψ−〉 = (|01〉 − |10〉)/√2.
Half of each pair of the first 2N entangled pairs are dis-
tributed to Alice, while the other half is kept with Trent.
Each half of the other 2N pairs is sent to Bob. Then,
Trent randomly measures either of the two observables
(Accept or Reject) on each of 4N qubits left with him.
Random N results obtained from measuring the first 2N
qubits are sends to Bob (together with the classical infor-
mation of their positions within the first 2N pairs), and
analogously with the other 2N results (N of which are
sent to Alice). We see that this situation is equivalent to
the above, when instead of entangled, Trent sends qubits
in pure states.
Finally, we note that it is simple to generalize our pro-
tocol for the case of arbitrary number of parties. In case
of n parties, a classical information about the prepara-
tion of each of N qubits sent to, say the first client, is
divided into N/(n − 1) sets Si, with i = 2, . . . n, such
that each set Si is sent to the i-th client. The protocol
is executed in N rounds, such that in the i-th step of
each round, the i-th client is performing a single-qubit
measurement and publicly announces the result to all of
the remaining (n− 1) clients. To declare contract valid,
t binding all of the n clients, the requirements analogous
to the ones for the two-party protocol must be satisfied
between each of the
(
n
2
)
pairs of clients. This, as well
as the above mentioned generalizations of our protocol,
will be discussed in more detail elsewhere.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a fair and optimistic quantum pro-
tocol for signing contracts that does not require the ex-
change of information with the trusted party during the
Exchange phase. Unlike the classical proposals, its fair-
ness is based on the laws of physics rather than on send-
ing signed messages, that are only computationally se-
cure. Thus, no keys are generated during the Exchange
phase and the protocol is abuse-free. For single-qubit
orthogonal measurements, the complexity of the proto-
col scales as N ∝ ε−2, where N is the number of ex-
changed messages and ε given threshold for the proba-
bility to cheat. Analogously to the previous proposal of a
quantum contract signing protocol [25], the present one
could also be performed using either entangled pairs or
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two, instead of four pure states, but it does not require
tamper-proof devices nor is based on the effects of deco-
herence (which are necessary for achieving [25]). Also,
it is simple to generalize it to involve many clients. Our
protocol can easily be altered such that only one client
is enough to present her/his results in order to bind the
contract and obtain the document declaring the contract
as valid. In this case, the probability to cheat becomes a
joint probability that a client can bind a contract, while
the other cannot. The fairness condition of a negligible
probability to cheat is in this case slightly weaker than
the one of [7]. Also, in our quantum protocol the trusted
party is slightly more involved than in the classical pro-
tocol presented in [6]. Nevertheless, being based on the
laws of physics, our protocol has other security advan-
tages over the classical counterparts. Moreover, it can be
used for designing other quantum information and secu-
rity protocols. Indeed, our approach was used to design
the protocols of simultaneous dense coding and telepor-
tation between spatially distant clients [11]. Finally, our
protocol could be easily performed with the current tech-
nology used in quantum cryptography.
The possible future lines of research include a detailed
study of the effects of noise and multi-particle measure-
ments on the fairness of the protocol and its complexity.
Today’s quantum technology is still at its infancy and
experimental realizations and technological applications
of quantum information protocols are relatively rare and
not always as reliable as classical alternatives. Even the
security of quantum cryptography, that is proven to be
unconditionally secure under the effects of noise, is still
very much dependent on the technology used. Neverthe-
less, the development of quantum technology has already
proven to be remarkable and beyond many of early expec-
tations, and will for sure continue to develop. Another
possible line of future research could be a further study of
alternative versions of quantum contract signing proto-
cols with possibly better properties and designing novel
quantum information, security and computation proto-
cols involving spatially distant clients that require timely
decisions.
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